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Abstract We study two boundedly rational procedures in consumer behavior. We show that
these procedures can be detected by conditions on observable demand data of the same
type as standard revealed preference axioms. This provides the basis for a non-parametric
analysis of boundedly rational consumer behavior mirroring the classical one for utility
maximization.
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1 Introduction
The original idea of Samuelson [18]’s revealed preference approach was to find conditions
under which observed consumer behavior ‘reveals’ full rationality, in the form of utility
maximization. Because it permits direct, nonparametric tests of the theory, this approach
enjoys considerable success1. But suppose that a consumer does not reveal full rationality.
Can he ‘reveal’ some form of bounded rationality, and if so, how? The question is pertinent
in view of the increasing interest in boundedly rational models of individual choice behavior.
In this paper we study two forms of bounded rationality that are amenable to tests of exactly
the same nature as those used in the revealed preference literature2.
Our approach is underpinned by the observation that consumer behavior may be stable,
consistent, and traceable to simple rules (and therefore predictable in principle), even when
it is not determined by utility maximization. For a quick example (more detailed ones are
studied later), suppose you observe the choice of a consumer deciding how to allocate his
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1 See Afriat [1], Houthakker [10], Richter [16] Suzumura [19] and Varian [21] for classic treatments
and Varian [22] and Blundell [2] for recent discussions of the modern economic and econometric theory of
revealed preference.
2 In the concluding section we expand on the meaning of ‘the same nature’.
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budget between platinum and diamonds. Your data consists of two budgets, Bx and By, at
which the observed choices are x and y, respectively (see figure 1).
These data are inconsistent with the existence of a nonsatiated utility function that the
consumer is maximizing: if u(x)≥ u(y), then it cannot be that y is chosen out of By, where
x costs less. However an observer might ‘rationalize’ the consumer choice by the following
rule of behavior: ‘I only care about the most expensive item, on which I spend my entire
budget’. Though not fully rational, this demand behavior is as consistent and as predictable
as fully rational demand behavior. The data are incompatible with a model of utility max-
imization, but it can be shown that they are still consistent with a model of maximizing
behavior.3 As we shall explain in detail below, they are in particular compatible with the
(possibly sequential) maximization of binary relations: if we knew the binary relation(s),
we would know how the consumer would choose in any given situation. The question is,
when are the choice data consistent with this type of explanation?
We consider two rather different types of bounded rationality:
1) Retain the assumption of maximizing behavior, but drop all the assumptions that lead
from the maximization of a relation to the maximization of utility. The consumer discards
all bundles which are dominated according to a strict binary relation, without this relation
necessarily exhibiting standard properties such as transitivity or completeness.
2) The consumer uses a sequential procedure, based on two binary relations, to first
discard consumption bundles and then select from the resulting ‘shortlist’.
The idea of ‘revelation’ of bounded rationality in (1) is not new at the formal level -
although it was originally not presented as such. We report an existing (but maybe not widely
known) characterization result (theorem 3) due to Kim and Richter [12], which builds on the
classical work on revealed preference by Richter [16]. In addition, we provide a new partial
characterization result (theorem 1) which gives an interesting set of sufficient conditions for
3 Of course, the data would be compatible with the maximization of ‘menu-dependent’ preferences (i.e.
dependent on prices), but then any observed behavior could be rationalized in this way. This is an approach
different from ours, and more in line with, for example Kalai et al. [11]. We adhere to the standard revealed
preference methodology, in the sense that we assume that consumers use procedures which, though possibly
not fully rational, can be falsified by the data.
3the demand data to be consistent with the maximization of a strict binary relation. In this set,
the main condition simply says that each consumption bundle is observed to be demanded (if
at all) at only one price vector (though demand is allowed to be multivalued). Two additional
well-behavedness conditions complete the set.
The procedure in (2) is inspired by several sequential eliminative heuristics promoted,
for general choice, by prominent psychologists (see e.g. Tversky [20] and Gigerenzer and
Todd [6]). Sequential procedures are also specifically documented in the field of consumer
choice by marketing scientists: for example Yee et al. [23] offer strong evidence of the use
by consumers of “two stage consideration and choice” decision making procedures. Finally,
particular versions of such two-stage procedures may look natural when the decision unit
that plans consumption is a collective, notably a household, rather than a single individual:
for example, it looks plausible that first the household members select the Pareto optimal
bundles on the basis of their individual preferences - as first proposed by Chiappori [4] - and
then they select among the Pareto optimal bundles by means of some ‘collective’ criterion4.
This is a more radical departure from ordinary maximization, and it is not obvious which
observable conditions on demand data imply, or are implied by, these procedures. In fact,
no such conditions exist at the moment, and only indirect estimation algorithms are used
to infer boundedly rational procedures5. What we have at the moment is only some results
in the context of abstract choice from finite sets, and therefore not directly applicable to
consumer theory). More specifically, in Manzini and Mariotti [14] we study a procedure
similar to (2) for single-valued choice functions, while Rubinstein and Salant [17] provide
further analysis of our procedure in the finite context6.
In this paper we show that weakening the sufficient conditions for type (1) of bounded
rationality (by dropping the well-behavedness conditions) yields exactly the procedure in
(2) (theorem 2). More importantly, we provide a complete characterization (theorem 4).
In this characterization, the necessary and sufficient conditions are analogous to the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), in the sense that the asymmetry of a certain type
of revealed preference relation, expressed in terms of demand data, is required.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce some notation and
provide an extended example. In section 3 we carry out the formal analysis. In the conclud-
ing section we briefly discuss the results.
2 Notation and an example
2.1 Notation
Let P⊆RN++ denote a set of price vectors. P is interpreted as the set of price vectors at which
observations of demanded quantities are made, and it can be finite or (as a limiting case)
infinite. Let X ⊆RN+ denote a set of consumption bundles. For any p∈ P, let the competitive
budget set B(p) (henceforth simply budget) be defined by B(p) = {x ∈ X |px≤ 1}.
4 Interestingly, beyond the sphere of consumer economics, sequential procedures are also used in
many other contexts such as recruitement (where shortlisting candidates is a common procedure)
and clinical medicine. For example, the online self-help guide of the UK National Health Service
(http://www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/SelfHelp/symptoms/) helps users to recognize an ailment by giving binary an-
swers along a ‘tree’ of symptoms. This is very different from the possible alternative approach of constructing
an aggregate ‘index’ of symptoms, and may formalize the mental process of a trained doctor.
5 For recent examples see e.g. Kohli and Jedidi [13] and Yee et al. [23].
6 We discuss these issues further in the concluding section.
4A demand is a nonempty correspondence D : P→ X with D(p) ⊆ B(p) for all p ∈ P.
It is the map that associates the observed consumption bundles to each observed price (we
allow more than one consumption bundle to be observed at each price; the results would
hold equally well with single-valued observations).
Vector notation: x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i and x 6= y.
2.2 An Example
The following extended example introduces informally the two boundedly rational proce-
dures we study in this paper.
The frugal consumer. Consider the following demand of the N goods z ∈RN++.
D(p) = arg min
pz=1
V (z)
where V : RN+ → R is a strictly increasing function. The frugal consumer adheres to a
simply expressed rule of behavior: she chooses, in each budget, the bundles which, among
the efficient ones, minimize the ‘aggregate amount’ of commodities, where the aggregate
amount of commodities is measured by the function V .
How could this observed behavior be modeled in terms of maximization of binary rela-
tions? Obviously the answer depends on the function V . Consider first:
V (z) =
N
∑
i=1
z2i
With V thus specified, D is single valued and (as is easy to check) it violates Samuelson’s
WARP, which say that (with single-valued demand observations) if there is p ∈ P for which
x ∈ D(p) and y is affordable at p then there is no p′ ∈ P for which y ∈ D(p′) and x is
affordable at p′. Therefore D is incompatible with a utility maximization model.
Nonetheless, the frugal consumer’s behavior can be expressed in terms of a binary rela-
tion K (which, lacking the properties of a preference, we call a ‘criterion’). Define, for all
x,y ∈ X with x 6= y
xKy⇔ @p ∈ P such that x ∈ B(p) and y = arg min
pz=1
V (z)
Then observed demand is compatible with the following:
d-procedure: Discard, from each budget, all and only those bundles that are worse,
according to the criterion K, than some other affordable bundle.
For instance, suppose you only observe the demand from two bundles Bx and By as
depicted in figure 2.2, where Bi denotes a budget from which bundle i = x,y is demanded. It
is easy to see that xKz for all bundles z ∈ Bx such that z 6= y, since with the two observations
you have there are no price vectors such that z 6= y solves the constrained minimization
problem when x is affordable, the only exception being bundle y. But, for a bundle like x′
in figure 2.2 it is x′Ky, since there are no (observed) budgets such that x′ is affordable when
y minimizes the objective function. Consequently, the d-procedure selects x uniquely from
budget Bx (and similarly one can verify that it selects y uniquely from budget By). Note in
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Fig. 2 The frugal consumer aggregates with ∑i z2i
particular that, unlike the case of utility maximization, y is ‘eliminated’ not by the demanded
bundle x itself, but rather by bundles that are themselves not demanded.
Next, consider the following alternative specification for the aggregation function:
V (z) =
N
∑
i=1
zi
The resulting (multivalued) demand is no longer explainable via the d-procedure. To see
this, let N = 2 and consider prices p = (1,1). The entire budget line is the demand at these
prices. So, suppose there is some relation K that ‘rationalizes’ demand. Letting x = (1,0),
we have yKx for no y affordable at p. Then at prices p′ = (1,2), x is still affordable, and it
should be chosen since B(p′) ⊂ B(p) and therefore yKx for no y affordable at p′. But it is
easy to check that D(p′) =
{(
0, 12
)}
(see figure 3).7
However, demand may be recovered by sequentially applying two relations K1 and K2
defined as follows:
xK1y if and only if x > y
xK2y if and only if
N
∑
i=1
xi <
N
∑
i=1
yi
These can be used in the following alternative procedure, which extends the previous one
by adding a round of ‘selection’:
7 Formally, this demand function violates the V-axiom defined in the next section.
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Fig. 3 The frugal consumer aggregates with ∑i zi
dc-procedure First discard from each budget all and only those bundles that are
worse than some other affordable bundle according to K1; then, among the surviving
bundles, choose all and only those bundles that according to K2 are not worse than
any other surviving bundle and are better than each surviving rejected one.
Note in particular that with this procedure, in the second round any bundle which is
rejected is eliminated by the bundles which are actually demanded. In this sense the term
‘choose’, rather than ‘discard’ appears justified.
In the example, with the dc-procedure, first all the Pareto dominated bundles are dis-
carded from a budget, and on the budget line the ‘Utilitarian’ minimizers are selected, thus
yielding exactly the demand D.
3 Boundedly rational procedures
In this section we define formally the two procedures illustrated with the frugal consumer
example. The following concept originated in Kim and Richter [12]).8
A demand D is discard rational (d-rational) if there exists a relation K such that
D(p) = {x ∈ B(p) |yKx for no y ∈ B(p)}
In this case we say that K d-rationalizes, or is a d-rationale for, the demand.9
Next we introduce a two-stage boundedly rational procedure. Given a binary relation K
onRN+ and S⊂RN+ , denote max(S,K) = {x ∈ S|yKx for no y ∈ S}.
8 They use the term ‘motivated’ instead of d-rational.
9 In their elegant paper Kim and Richter [12] show that a demand D is d-rational if and only if there exists
a relation K such that
D(p) = {x ∈ B(p) |xKy for all y ∈ B(p)}
The demand from each budget is (weakly) ‘better’ than all elements in the budget according to the relation
K.
7A demand D is discard and choose rational (dc-rational) if there exist two relations
K1 and K2 such that
D(p) = max(max(B(p) ,K1) ,K2)
and xK2y for all x ∈ D(p) and y ∈max(B(p) ,K1)\D(p)
In this case we say that K1 and K2 dc-rationalize, or are dc-rationales for, the choice.10
Observe that, crucially, the two dc-rationales are always applied in the same order for
all budgets.
3.1 Sufficient conditions
We provide partial characterizations of the above concepts in terms of the following condi-
tions on demand, which are very easy to observe.
D is inverse single-valued iff D−1(x) is empty or single valued for all x ∈ X .
D is interior iff x ∈RN++ for all x ∈ D(p), for all p ∈ P.
D is budget exhaustive iff px = 1 for all x ∈ D(p), for all p ∈ P.
In the case of ordinary utility maximization, all these properties are satisfied, for exam-
ple, by the Cobb-Douglas demand function.
Theorem 1 Any inverse single-valued, interior and budget-exhaustive demand is d-rational.
Proof: Suppose that D satisfies the properties and define the d-rationale K as follows:
xKy iff y /∈ D(p) for all p ∈ P such that x,y ∈ B(p).
Consider any p ∈ P and let x ∈ D(p). Then for no y ∈ B(p) can it be the case that yKx.
Let y /∈ D(p). We show that zKy for some z ∈ B(p). Suppose not. Then for all z ∈ B(p)
there exists pz ∈ P such that y ∈ D(pz) and z ∈ B(pz). By inverse single-valuedness it must
be that there exists some py ∈ P such that pz = py for all pz. In particular, this implies
B(p)⊆ B(py), and y ∈RN++ by interiority. We show that this implies a contradiction.
Since y ∈ B(p), we have py ≤ 1 = pyy (where the equality follows from budget ex-
haustion). Consider first the case py = 1 = pyy. So (given that y ∈ RN++) either p = py
or there exists i, j with pi > (py)i and p j < (py) j. The former case cannot apply, for then
D(p) =D(py), contradicting the assumptions y /∈D(p) and y ∈D(py). The latter case can-
not apply either. If it did, we could construct a bundle y′ with y′ ∈ B(p) and y′ /∈ B(py) by
setting, for small ε,η > 0, y′i = yi− ε (possible by y ∈RN++), y′j = y j +η , with ε pi = η p j,
and yk = y′k for all other k. The existence of such a y
′ contradicts B(p)⊆ B(py).
It remains to consider the case py < 1. This is impossible in view of B(p)⊆ B(py) and
budget exhaustion.
The next result shows that by dropping the interiority and budget exhaustion conditions
we can still model demand behavior in terms of binary relations and bounded rationality.
10 Alternatively:
D(p) = {x ∈max(B(p) ,K1) : xK2y for all y ∈max(B(p) ,K1)\D(p)}
8Theorem 2 Any inverse single-valued demand is dc-rational.
Proof. Let D be inverse single-valued. Define the dc-rationale K1 by xK1y iff y /∈ D(p)
for all p∈ P such that x,y∈ B(p). Define the dc-rationale K2 as follows: xK2y iff there exists
p ∈ P such that x ∈ D(p), y ∈ B(p)\D(p) and there exists py such that B(p)⊆ B(py) and
y ∈ D(py). By inverse single-valuedness p and py are unique if they exist.
Consider any p∈P and suppose that y∈B(p)\D(p). We show that either zK1y for some
z ∈ B(p) or xK2y for all x ∈ D(p). Suppose that zK1y for no z ∈ B(p). Then there exists a
unique (by inverse single-valuedness) py ∈ P such that y ∈ D(py) and B(p) ⊆ B(py). By
definition this implies that xK2y for all x ∈ D(p).
Now take x ∈ D(p). It is obvious that zK1x for no z ∈ B(p). We show that yK2x for
no y ∈max(B(p) ,K1). Suppose not, and let yK2x for some y ∈max(B(p) ,K1). Then there
exists a unique py ∈ P with y ∈ D(py), x ∈ B(py)\D(py) and B(py) ⊆ B(p). On the other
hand if y∈max(B(p) ,K1), by definition of K1 it must be B(p)⊆ B(py). Therefore B(py) =
B(p), contradicting x ∈ D(p) and x /∈ D(py).
3.2 Characterizations
Next, we move to conditions on observed demand which, though less simple, completely
characterize d- and dc-rationality.
The key result on d-rationality, due to Kim and Richter [12], is reported after the follow-
ing definition11:
The V-Axiom. For all p ∈ P and x ∈ B(p): if for all z ∈ B(p) there exists pz ∈ P such that
x ∈ D(pz) and z ∈ B(pz), then x ∈ D(p).
Theorem 3 (Kim and Richter [12]) A demand is d-rational if and only if it satisfies the
V-Axiom.
The concept of dc-rationality is more permissive than that of d-rationality. As we saw
above, there are dc-rational demands that are not d-rational. Are all demands dc-rational?
The answer is no, and we provide below two examples illustrating two different ways in
which dc-rationality may fail.
A lonely decision maker wants to treat himself on the night of his birthday, purchasing
a meal either in restaurant A or in restaurant B. In order to enjoy the ‘treat’ element he
wants to buy the more expensive meal, if affordable. More generally, this example captures
the case where a decision maker has some ideal level of consumption of a good of a given
type, and his preferences are such that he wishes to purchase exactly that amount of the
most expensive type, if affordable. Suppose that in budget B(py) a meal in restaurant B is
relatively more expensive than a meal in restaurant A, while the opposite is true in budget
B(px), and in budget B(p) both meals are equally expensive. If we let bundles x and y ,
indicate the optimal amounts of either only good of type A or only good of type B (e.g. a four
course set meal in restaurant A and B, respectively), this criterion generates the following
demand:
D(px) = {x} ,D(py) = {y} ,D(p) = {x,y}
with B(p) ⊂ B(py)⊂ B(px)
as depicted in figure 4.
11 Campbell [3] also reports interesting conditions for d-rationality. However, they require the convexity of
P and are therefore not suited to the domain of application we have in mind here.
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Fig. 4 A lonely soul’s treat on his birthday night out
Indeed, this demand, though plausible, is not dc-rational. To see this, observe that since
bundle x is rejected from budget B(py) while bundle y is demanded, it must be that yK2x.
But this then makes it impossible for x to be maximal with respect to K2 in budget B(p)
(one could have made a symmetric reasoning observing that since bundle y is rejected from
budget B(px) while bundle x is demanded, it must be that xK2y).
Consider now the following demand:
D(p2) = {x} ,D(p1) = {y}= D(p3)
with B(p1) ⊂ B(p2)⊂ B(p3)
depicted in figure 5, where as before x and y refer to bundles with the optimal amounts of
either only good of type A or only good of type B, respectively. Observe that in both B(p1)
and B(p3) meal y is relatively more expensive than meal x, while the opposite is true in
budget B(p2).
Once more this demand, though reasonable in the context of our story, is not dc-rational.
To see this, observe that since bundle y is rejected from budget B(p2) while bundle x is
demanded, it must be that xK2y. But this then makes it impossible for y to be maximal with
respect to K2 in budget B(p1)⊂ B(p2).12
In order to provide a characterization of dc-rationality in terms of observable demand
behavior, we introduce a new type of revealed preference relation. Denote the standard direct
revealed preference relation (x is demanded and y is rejected from some budget) by PD: that
12 Examples similar to those presented can easily be found even under the assumption that demand is
budget-exhaustive, though not with only two goods.
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is, xPDy if and only if there exists p ∈ P such that x ∈D(p) and y ∈ B(p)\D(p). Samuelson
proposed the asymmetry of the direct revealed preference relation as the observable test of
utility maximization13. We introduce a similar asymmetry test, only applied to a weaker
revealed preference relation, P∗D. We say that xP∗Dy if and only if there exists p ∈ P such that
x ∈ D(p) and y ∈ B(p)\D(p) (that is xPDy) and for all z ∈ B(p) there exists pz such that
y ∈ D(pz) and z ∈ B(pz). That is, x is directly revealed preferred to y in a budget, but at the
same time y is demanded in the presence of any alternative bundle in that budget.
Axiom A: [xP∗Dy]⇒ not [yP∗Dx].
Axiom B: for all p ∈ P: [x,y ∈ D(p)]⇒ not [yP∗Dx].
Remark 1 For single-valued demand (the data are single choice observations from budgets)
Axiom B is vacuously satisfied14.
Remark 2 The two axioms are independent, as demonstrated by the two examples above.
In the example of figure 4, note that D(px) = {x}, D(py) = {y} and B(py) ⊂ B(px) imply
that yP∗Dx while not (xP∗Dy), so that Axiom A holds. However Axiom B fails since yP∗Dx and
D(p) = {x,y}.
In the example of figure 5, note that D(p2) = {x}, D(p1) = {y} and B(p1) ⊂ B(p2)
imply that xP∗Dy, while D(p2) = {x}, D(p3) = {y} and B(p2)⊂ B(p3) imply that yP∗Dx, so
that Axiom A fails. Axiom B holds trivially, as the observed demand is single valued.
13 However, this in fact only works for two commodities. The asymmetry of PD, or WARP, does not char-
acterize in general any standard notion of rational behavior, though Kim and Richter [12] do provide a partial
characterization, and Clarke [5] and Mariotti [15] relate it to a modified notion of rationality.
14 Note that if demand is single valued, the premise of Axiom B is always false.
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Our main characterization result is the following:
Theorem 4 A demand is dc-rational if and only if it satisfies Axiom A and Axiom B.
Proof. Let D be dc-rationalized by K1 and K2. Suppose that xP∗Dy, and in particular that
(i) x∈D(p), (ii) y∈B(p)\D(p), and (iii) for all z∈B(p) there exists pz such that y∈D(pz)
and z ∈ B(pz). Condition (iii) implies that there is no z ∈ B(p) for which zK1y.
We show that P∗D is asymmetric (Axiom A). Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) and the dc-
rationality of D imply that xK2y. Now take any p′ such that y ∈D(p′) and x ∈ B(p′)\D(p′)
(if no such p′ exists, then the asymmetry of P∗D follows vacuously). For D to be dc-rational,
it must be the case that x is eliminated in the first stage, that is there exists z ∈ B(p′) such
that zK1x. Therefore it cannot be the case that for all z ∈ B(p′) there exists pz such that
x ∈ D(pz) and z ∈ B(pz), so it cannot be yP∗Dx.
Next we show that for all p′ ∈ P, not [x,y ∈ D(p′)] (Axiom B). Since xP∗Dy, it must be
the case for D to be dc-rational that xK2y. Then it cannot be the case that x,y ∈ D(p′) with
D dc-rational.
For the other direction of the statement, let D satisfy the axioms, and define K1 as xK1y
iff y /∈ D(p) for all p ∈ P such that x,y ∈ B(p). Define K2 = P∗D.
Consider any p ∈ P and suppose that y /∈ D(p). We show that either zK1y for some
z ∈ B(p) or xK2y for all x ∈D(p). Suppose that zK1y for no z ∈ B(p). Then for all z ∈ B(p)
there exists pz such that z∈ B(pz) and y∈D(pz). By definition this means that xK2y for any
x ∈ D(p).
Now take x ∈ D(p). It is obvious that zK1x for no z ∈ B(p). We show that yK2x for no
y ∈max(B(p) ,K1). Suppose not, and let yK2x. Then by Axiom A K2 (= P∗D) is asymmetric,
so it must be y ∈ D(p) (otherwise, since x ∈ D(p) and y survives the first round, we would
have also xK2y). But this contradicts Axiom B.
Compared with the standard SARP and GARP conditions on demand15, our key Axiom
A is simpler in one respect and more complex in another. It is simpler, because it uses a
direct revealed preference relation (P∗D) instead of the transitive closure of a direct relation.
However, more observations are needed to check xP∗Dy than to check xPDy. With two com-
modities, for example, we need at least two observations (one to check that x is chosen from
a budget B(p), and at least another one to check that y is demanded in the presence of any
alternative bundle in B(p)). If budget exhaustion were required, then unless y is in a corner,
one needs at least three observations (at least two to check that y is demanded in the presence
of any alternative bundle in B(p)).
Also, observe that when the direct revealed preference relation PD is asymmetric as
proposed by Samuelson, the relation P∗D is empty. In this case, it is the first stage only that
governs behavior.
Another natural procedure related to dc-rationality is expressed as follows. A demand D
is dd-rational if there exist two relations K1 and K2 such that
D(p) = max(max(B(p) ,K1) ,K2)
The definition is the same as dc-rationality except for the fact that in this case the de-
manded bundles do not need to dominate the discarded ones at the second stage. A revealed
preference characterization of dd-rationality is still an open question. This is the exact ana-
logue in a consumer theory setting of the notion of Rational Shortlist Methods (RSM),
15 Let the demand D be single-valued. Let PtD be the transitive closure of PD.
D satisfies SARP if PD is acyclic (or equivalently PtD is asymmetric). D satisfies GARP if xP
t
Dy implies
px≥ py for all p ∈ P such that y = D(p).
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which, as we mention in the introduction, we introduced and characterized in Manzini and
Mariotti [14]. A choice function γ is an RSM whenever there exist two asymmetric binary
relations K1 and K2 such that, for every feasible set S, γ (S) = max(max(S,K1) ,K2). In-
terestingly, our characterization of (single-valued) RSMs relies on axioms that cannot be
extended trivially to a consumer setting. More precisely, RSMs are characterized (on the set
of all subsets of a finite set) by a weakening of WARP and by an expansion axiom. As for
the latter, we require that if the same element is chosen from two distinct menus, then this
same element should be chosen from the union of the two menus. Such an axiom would
not serve any purpose in a consumer theory setting, given the lack of closure of the set of
budget sets under set union. Similarly, the weakening of WARP that we employ in the finite
domain imposes conditions on choices from binary sets, which of course are not the object
of analysis in consumer theory16.
4 Concluding remarks
We have proposed characterizations of two boundedly rational procedures in consumer
choice. The conditions in these characterizations are expressed only in terms of observable
demand data, and therefore are of the same nature as the conditions of ordinary revealed
preference theory. They allow nonparametric tests of the decision procedures we have stud-
ied, just as GARP allows nonparametric tests of the model of consumer utility maximization.
To labor this point, note that we have not expanded the domain of choice to include un-
usual data, as is sometimes done in the search for testable conditions on models explaining
behavioral ‘anomalies’. As a notable example, in order to explain time inconsistent choices
between dated alternatives, Gul and Pesendorfer in a remarkable series of papers17 enlarge
the domain of preferences to include, beside standard alternatives, also ‘menus’ of alterna-
tives. While theoretically elegant, this approach uses data (such as preferences over menus)
which are not part of standard consumer microeconometrics data (e.g. family budget sur-
veys)18. So, although that approach leads to conditions which are testable in principle, such
conditions are one step removed from the ordinary revealed preference data for consumer
choice. It is certainly possible to infer consumers’ preferences over some menus (for ex-
ample their rejection of some alternatives through commitment may be construed as their
choice of a menu), but obtaining the entire preference relation needed for the theory may be
a tall order, and will certainly need additional data and empirical techniques. For this reason,
that approach may be more suitable for experimental evidence rather than market data.
In a recent paper, Rubinstein and Salant [17] propose a model in which choice data
are, as standard, subsets of the (finite) sets of feasible alternatives. However, the choice is
made to depend not only on the feasible set itself, but also on another object, called a frame.
In other words, the choice from a set S is formalized as c(S, f ), where f is the frame. An
example of a frame is the order in which the alternatives in S are presented. Another example
is a distinguished alternative (e.g. the status quo) in S. Frames are conceived as observable
objects, so this is yet another method for enriching the set of data available in a revealed
preference analysis.
We view our approach in this paper as complementary to these contributions, in the
sense that it is entirely feasible with the standard techniques and data applied to consumer
choice.
16 Weak WARP: If y 6= x = γ ({x,y}) = γ (T ) and {x,y} ⊆ S⊆ T then y 6= γ (S).
17 E.g. Gul and Pesendorfer [7], [8], [9].
18 See e.g. Blundell [2].
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